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INTRODUCTION
For forty-four years the Interstate Commerce
Commission has regulated the trucking industry resulting in
high profit and reasonable stability for business and consumer alike.

But, many economists claim motor carrier rates

and profits are too high; their market shares too large; and,
competition within particular markets too low.

About 110

billion dollars is spent annually to ship goods by motor
truck, but the ICC only regulates about twenty-six billion
dollars, or roughly twenty-five percent of the total industry revenues that go to regulated common carriers (1976
figures) .

Yet, this segment of an otherwise widely diverse

and heterogeneous industry represents only ten percent of
the total number of trucking companies.l
The purpose of this paper is to examine competition
and comcentration within the regulated common carrier segment of the motor carrier industry; and, through analysis
of available data, determine the necessity of motor carrier
deregulation.

lMichael Thoryn, "Freight Transportation: A Network
of Life's Necessities," )!ation's Business, (December 1978)
pp. 60-66.

V

I.

THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

To check the growing power of the railroads, Congress
passed the original Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 which
created the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The Commission

was tasked with the responsibility of preventing railroads
from abusing their monopoly powers, especially the common
practices of allowing rate concessions to high volume
shippers while gouging small shippers such as farmers and
businessmen.

Heavy Commission emphasis was placed on

limiting maximum rates charged.

Only under the Transporta-

tion Act of 1920 was the ICC initially assigned control
over entry into the transportation industry.

The ICC was

mandated the authority to restrain the creation, expansion,
or abandonment of railroads by awarding or withholding
certificates of public convenience and necessity.

Also,

this act introduced criteria concerning minimum rate regulation by inherent advantage for the first time. 2

Congress

bestowed control of the trucking industry entry restrictions
upon the ICC during the financially troubled 1930s.

To

protect the infant motor carrier industry and prevent undue
competition with the impoverished Depression Era railroads,

2Robert C. Fellmeth et al, The Interstate Commerce
Ommision: The Public Interest and the ICC (New York, N.Y.:
Grossman Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 119.
1

2

the commission strictly limited motor carrier entry by
interpreting the definition of public convenience so
severely that applicants for motor carrier authority faced
insurmountable burdens of proof under the Motor Carrier Act
of 1935.3
To this day, in public convenience and necessity applications, a prospective carrier must show particular shipper
need for service such as the inability of existing carriers
to provide adequate levels of service.

As defined by the

ICC, adequate service means the capacity and equipment to
transport freight traffic within a particular area.

Carrier

inefficiency and high freight rates have no bearing on ICC
considerations of adequate service.

According to Wellspeak,

Common Carrier Application I M.C.C. 712, pages 715-716 (1937),
a prospective carrier's proposal to provide competitive
service at lower rates than the competition is irrelevant
and unallowable in an authority application in the ICC's
view.

Likewise, an offer of increased carrier service holds

no sway in ICC authority considerations.

The overriding

factor is the present carrier capacity and whether or not
sufficient equipment is available to serve customer's
freight transportation needs. 4
The United States Government Manual describes the ICC's
organizational structure and operational functions as follows:

3Ibid., pp. 119-120.
4 Ibid.

3

The Chairman is designated by the President from
among the Commissioners. The Commissioners elect
their own Vice Chairman annually.
The other nine
Commissioners serve on one of three divisions:
Operating
Rights (Division One); Rates, Tariffs, and Valuation
(Division Two); and Finance and Service (Division Three)
The entire Commission acts on matters of national
transportation importance. The Commission may delegate
certain duties and functions to individual Commissioners
or to boards consisting of not less than three eligible
employees. The three divisions function as appellate
divisions for actions on petitions for reconsideration
or rehearigg of decisions of divisions or boards of
employees.
In the transportation economics area, the Commission
settles controversies over rates and charges among
competing and like modes of transportation, shippers,
and receivers of freight, passengers, and others.
It
rules upon applications for mergers, consolidations,
acquisitions of control, and the sale of carriers and
issuance of their securities.
It prescribes accounting
rules, awards reparations, and administers laws relating
to railroad bankruptcy.
It acts to prevent unlawful
discrimination, destructive competition and rebating.
It also has jurisdiction over the use, control, supply,
movement, distribution, exchange, interchange, and
return of railroad equipment. Under certain conditions,
it is authorized to direct the handling and movement of
traffic over a railroad and its distribution over other
lines of railroads.
In the transportation service area, the Commission
grants the right to operate to trucking companies, bus
lines, freight forwarders, water carriers, and transportation brokers.
It approves applications to construct and abandon lines of railroad, and it rules upon
discontinuances of passenger train service.
Although public hearings on matters before the
Commission may be held at any point throughout the
country, final decisions are made at the Washington,
D.C., headquarters in all formal proceedings. These
cases include rulings upon rate changes, applications
to engage in for-hire transport, carrier mergers,
adversary proceedings on complaint actions, and punitive
measures taken in enforcement matters.
Consumer protection programs involve assuring that
the public obtains full measure of all transportation
services to which entitlement is guaranteed by the
Interstate Commerce Act.
This law ensures that rates

5u.s., Office of the Federal Register, United States
Government Manual, 1974-75 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, July 1, 1974), pp. 511-513.

]
4

will be fair and service will be reasonable. Discrimination, preferential treatment or prejudicial actions by
carriers is illegal and instances of such violations
should be brought to the attention of the Commission at
its headquarters or any field office.6
Despite the merits of entry control in the 1935 motor
carrier industry, the stringent entry barriers were established by the ICC, not Congress.

No tight restrictions

were specified in the Interstate Commerce Act itself.

Today,

the ICC approach to conditions of 1935 no longer applies. 7

6Ibid.
7Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission:

120.

II.

BUSINESS REGULATION BACKGROUND

Public regulation of business evolved as a result of
drastic industrial and economic changes in American society.
In the 1870s and 1880s, certain special interest groups
found very little consolation in the country's rapid
economic growth which the industrial expansion had fostered.
Farmers established organizations to protect and promote
rural interests following low crop prices from 1870 to 1896.
Small businessmen and farmers joined forces to demand government action in curbing discriminatory railroad abuses.

Their

prolonged lobbying effort for public protection ultimately
resulted in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 which marked
the first economic regulation of business affairs by a
national commission--the Interstate Commerce Commission.8
According to Fainsod and Gordon 9 , there were several
characteristics involved in the growth of business regulation.

First, the growth of regulation in the United States

was not following any overall governmental plan but only
represented reactions to perceived abuses.

Second, federal

regulation arose due to the inability of state government

8Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent
Commission (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1955), pp. 16-17.
9 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
5

6

to satisfy public demands for protection from economic abuses.
Third, the New Deal program expanded the breadth of public
regulation but did not originate the drive to regulate
economic life.

Fourth, the expansion of governmental

economic regulation in the United States corresponded to
developments in other countries.

However, regulation by

commission was typically an American invention.

Fifth,

regulation was mainly the result of a clash of organized
economic interests seeking to use government's powers to
enhance their own interests, and government regulation was
necessary to maintain harmony among all factions.

For example,

most special interests such as farmers and small businessmen
were i.nterested in Commission authority to fix maximum railroad rates, prevent short-haul discriminations, and maintain
competition between railroads.lo
During the 1860s, the concept of laissez faire allowed
relatively wide latitude for governmental action.

Govern-

ment should do nothing in economic affairs except safeguard
private property rights.

Many economic groups supported

national railroad regulation and were more individualistic
in outlook than large corporations.

Since the main objective

of the Interstate Commerce Act was the elimination of monopolistic abuses, farmers and small businessmen applauded ICC
establishment as defense of individual free enterprise. 11

lOibid., pp. 20-21.
11Ibid.

-----~--------------------------------1
7

According to Bernstein, several arguments existed in favor
of the commission form of regulation:
(1)

A commission allowed flexible and expert admini-

stration while tradition law enforcement through the court
system would not work in transportation.
(2)

The expert commission body could aid the legisla-

tive branch of the federal government by providing expert
planning in regulatory policy.
(3)

The commission would be mandated to defend the

shipping public.
(4.)

The commission would arbitrate cases of cutthroat

competition.
(5)

The commission would serve the courts which pass

final judgement on particular issues.
(6)

Great Britain and several American states had

great previous success with strong regulatory commissions.1 2
Bernstein also pinpointed some definite disadvantages
in regulatory commissions:
(1)

A commission could elect to soften the enforce-

ment of a regulation by its own discretion.
(2)

Special interests would influence commission ap-

pointment to the ultimate extent that the commission would
represent only those special interests.
(3)

A commission would be subject to the whim of bi-

partisan politicians.

12rbid., pp. 24-25.

8

(4)

Transportation regulation could easily be too

large a job for one commission to handle.
(5)

A commission could be counterproductive and could

delay or obstruct effective regulation.
(6)

State commissions had failed to protect the

public through effective regulation on some past occasions. 13
Historically, public distrust of the judiciary resulted
in a transference of regulatory responsibilities to the Interstate Commerce Commission as an administrative agency.

The

ICC's first chairman, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, originated the
operational procedures which closely resembled a court of
law.

Each regulatory matter was considered on a strict case-

by-case deliberation.
today.

This procedure is still followed

The ICC regarded itself as a tribunal to settle

private party disputes rather than the ambitious promoter of
the public interest as it was mandated by Congress to be.
The Commission used the judicial approach to establish regulations in the controversial areas of transportation for several
reasons.

First, the courts would view commission decisions

more favorably if they were reached by judicial presentation
rather than administrative dictate.

Second, Commission

members were more at ease with the judicial process rather
than the unfamiliar administrative process.

Often, legal

actions brought by firms regulated by the ICC forced it to
fight regulatory battles in court. 14

13Ibid.
14Ibid., pp. 28-29.

9

The Interstate Commerce Commission received more
authority with the Transportation Act of 1920, but it had
to take a backseat to more pressing activities and efforts
of economic recovery during the Great Depression of the
1930s. 15

However, interest in independent commissions did

not decline during this period for several reasons.

First,

Senate investigation of stock exchange scandals following
the 1931-1932 stock market crash finally resulted in
establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
prevent security market manipulation.

Second, many members

of Congress supported the independent commission as a device
to counter power concentration in the executive branch of
government under strong presidents.

Third, the American

Bar Association campaigned to surround the regulatory process
with numerous and extensive procedures to insure no unfair
.
.
.
.
.
16
commission
ac t 'ions were un d er t a k en against
private
parties.

This effort resulted in a judicialized code of regulatory
procedure and gave a strong legal appearance to the independent commission.17
Two important issues soon surfaced in the independent
commission controversy.

First, critics contended the ICC

was unfit for its duties of settling regulatory disputes
unless its activities were safeguarded by laws insuring

15Ibid., p. 49.
16Ibid., pp. 53-54.
17Ibid.

.

'

'

I

l
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fairness of judicial review.

Curiously, these same critics

maintained that the impartiality, expert staff, and nonpartisan politics inherent in the Commission made it wellsuited for economic regulation and adjudication.

Thus,

the ICC became severely isolated from general public support
and unduly condemned for a lack of fairness.

Secondly,

implementation of ICC case decisions resulted in conflicts
of interest among agency commissioners since they were
required to promote the very transportation modes they
regulated. 18
Not unexpectedly, the public faced many contradictions
in regulation since the ICC was reputed to be fair and
impartial, and was to compensate for the deficiencies of
other partisan government branches.

However the Commission

could only operate with precise procedures similar to those
used in a court of law.

Vague regulations in the Commission

statutes allowed wide discretionary power.

Though the

business community generally opposed governmental authority,
it was not adversely opposed to increased Commission powers.
A lack of interest existed in the orderly development of
Commission regulation due to the priority placed on economic
recovery. 19

Even as early as 1933, noted government officials

were calling for abolishment of the ICC due to its overemphasis on judicial proceedings such as rate-making and

18Ibid., pp. 54-55.
19Ibid., pp. 56-58.

11

valuation and too little attention to planning and
administration. 20

2 OIbid. ,

p. 5 9 .

III.

COMMISSION RESTRICTIONS

ICC Authority Restrictions
Once motor carrier authority is established, each
firm is restricted so severely that it cannot directly compete with other authorized firms.

Under the Interstate

Commerce Act, the ICC may fashion authority restrictions at
its own discretion.

Section 208(a) of the Interstate Com-

merce Act requires that certificates be issued specifying
carrier service to be probided.

In philosophy and actual

practice, the ICC interprets its power to state terms,
limitations, and conditions in all authority granted under
this section.

In the ICC's own words, "From the beginning

of federal motor carrier regulation, restrictions generally
have been imposed to protect already authorized carriers
from intended or unwarranted competition.

,,21

Various

restrictions imposed by the ICC according to vehicle types,
points of origin and destination, routes traveled (even
down to particular roads), areas served, and specific commodities transported effectively establish granted market
areas where carriers may operate with minimum competition. 22

21Robert C. Fellmeth et al, The Interstate Commerce
Ommission (New York, N.Y.:
Grossman Publishers, Inc., 1970),
p. 120.
22Ibid.
12
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An ICC tabulation of regulated motor carrier
authority estimates that of the 91,335 authority grants
issued, 31,645 or 34.6 percent were of a restricted nature.
However, this Inventory of Motor Carrier Authority (IMCA)
uses the term restriction in a distorted and inaccurate
manner.

Robert C. Fellmeth states:

Specifically, IMCA "restrictions" refer to
basic limitations on equipment, service, tacking
and interchange, operation, auto-carriers, and
certain miscellany.
Supposedly, unrestricted
carriers--unrestricted according to the six
generic limitations abQve--are in fact further
restricted by routing. ~3
Routing limitations usually consist of service between
terminals at specified points only; between two particular
points; and between terminals with no points of service
in between. 24

Of the 88,483 grants to regular and irregular

carriers, sixteen percent (14,150) were unrestricted on
routing limitations and operational restrictions. 2 5
But even these sixteen percent of unrestricted carriers
are heavily limited by their individual commodity descriptions.

Carriers operating in the same geographical areas

and with the same restrictions cannot be competitive unless
they are allowed to carry identical commodities.

The IMCA

study has found an extremely small number of authority grants
that actually provide the shipper with comparable service

23Ibid., p. 121.
24 Ibid.
25Ibid., pp. 121-122.

14
and even those did not illustrate the total impact of what
is known as commodity diversification.

Only one percent of

the actual commodity descriptions are compatible with broad
commodity classifications on which freight rates depend.
Thus, though the commodity classifications may be the same
in a broad category, the specific descriptions can be so
. 1 y 1·imit
. competition
. .
.
26
minute as toe ff ective
among carriers.
Carriers often hold several grants of authority along
the same travel route to allow commodity clusters.

A com-

mon practice, commodity clustering within grants, gives
carriers larger authority which is potentially more competitive.

Limited multiple authority certificates are

relatively common; however, clustering within authority
grants is not.

Only 295 of 1305 authority grants provide

transportation for more than one commodity, and the clusters
created range in number from two commodities to as many as
fifty-five, with an average between three and four commodities
per cluster. 27
With possible clustering combinations of eighty or
more, the total number of commodity descriptions, routings,
and restrictions is overwhelming.

ICC authority grants can

be so detailed by these three factors that each is entirely
distinct from any other single grant.

Carriers can be faced

with limited service competition through customer services

26rbid., p. 122.
27 Ibid., pp. 122-123.

15
offered.

Only by analysis of services and cost and rate

structures offered in a particular area can the degree of
restrictive competition be determined.

In his 1956 Study

of New England Motor Carriers, Robert Nelson found that
actual restraint of competition is great and trending toward
even less competition in the future. 28

Trucking firms,

in increasing numbers, gain absolute monopoly power for
particular commodities over certain routes of travel
despite rates or service quality as a result of ICC protec.
.
29
tionism.
In Robert Fellmeth's words:
The ICC has justified its restrictions of competition among motor carriers by arguing at various times that (1) Common carrier services can be
required from certified carriers in exchange for
protection from competition; (2) The assured
profits resulting from reduced competition will
finance and encourage adequate investment and
technological progress; (3) Fly-by-night operations
will be screened out and chaotic conditions will
be avoided; and (4)
Duplications of investment
and excess capacity will be avoided.30
However, this justification falls flat because in reality,
limiting competition fails to guarantee availability or
performance of common carrier service.

Hundreds of ship-

pers complain to the ICC each year about carriers who deny
less than truckload service.

Many motor carriers fail to

transport low density, high risk commodities such as
furniture and seldom serve out-of-the-way commodities.

28Ibid., pp. 123-124.
29Ibid.
30Ibid., p. 124.

The

16
commission recognizes that carriers sometimes fail in their
common carrier duty.

Interestingly, the ICC prohibits

motor carrier use of the highly efficient Interstate Highway
system because it fears they would delete service to communities on traditional routes that are not located on the new
highway. 31
There are many cases of large, institutional shippers
who gain preferential treatment from regulated household
furnishings carriers at the expense of small individual
shippers.

Moving companies have accounts with large car-

porations such as General Electric.

If one of these national

accounts requires transportation of its employee's household furnishings, i t is common for moving companies to
bump individual shippers down the waiting list in order to
have equipment available to service the larger account no
matter which customer called first.

All too frequently,

this practice results in extensive delay of freight deliveries.

A flagrant abuse of the common carrier duty,

this policy is an example of the very shipper discrimination the Interstate Commerce Commission was created to
curb. 32

31Ibid., pp. 124-125.
32Ibid.

17
ICC Operational Restrictions
While most business regulation is retrospective in
nature, Transportation Rules and Statutes, as administered
by the Interstate Commerce Commission tend to be prospective
in nature.

In the former, businesses are allowed to make

price changes or implement business actions which may be
subject to governmental challenge afterwards; however, in
the latter, common carriers must, by law, publish, file,
and post their freight rates and notify the ICC of any
business actions they are preparing to take beforehand.
Carriers are not allowed to charge any other rate than that
lawfully on file and in effect when the freight movement
commenced. 33
In the ICC's view, shipper interests can only be protected by uniformly just and reasonable rates.

The publica-

tion procedure gives ample notice to all concerned shippers that a change is proposed.

Shippers opposing the

change as injurious to them may state their views before the
ICC rate bureau.

The ICC view prevails that without rate-

bureau procedures carriers would have to set rates individually.

Thus shippers who controlled large traffic volumes

would dominate leaving small shippers to suffer economic
hardship; then, shipper competition would be reduced. 34

33Ernest w. Williams, Jr., ed., The Future of American
Transportation (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1971), pp. 4-5.
34charles D. Drayton, Transportation Under Two Masters
(Washington, D.C.: National Law Book Company, 1946), p. 105.

---------------------------~l
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Rates can be changed only through tariff reissue
procedures or supplement on a statutory notice with the
commission--that is, by filing and posting thirty days in
advance of the effective date for a proposed rate change.
The ICC may suspend tariff filings for rate changes, rules,
or regulations for up to seven months to investigate their
legality.
in effect.

Meanwhile, former rates frequently still remain
ICC regulations require just, reasonable, and

nondiscriminatory rates along with maintenance of just and
reasonable freight classifications.

The ICC has authority

to dictate minimum, maximum, or actual rates in any case
where unlawful rate procedures were followed.

These com-

mission determined rates can remain in effect indefinitely.
Should an effective rate be found in excess, the commission
may order reparations awarded to customers of that carrier.
Although motor carrier regulation is extensive and repressive, carriers are allowed to set rates by group agreements
outside of antitrust jurisdiction.

They can do this through

rate bureaus in which representatives of carriers vote on
rate changes and through which most rates are published.
Rates are made for territorial groups of carriers and they
usually reflect the industry average conditions and revenues
needed for a particular geographic area. 35

35 w·11·
h Future
· o f American
·
·
i
iams, Te
Transportation:
4-5.
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The principal concern of the ICC has been the general
health and welfare of the carriers it regulates.

Yet many

of its policies seldom benefit the very transportation
companies it regulates.

The Commission is extremely con-

cerned with stability of the transportation system and the
continued short-term financial wellbeing of existing carriers,
even to the detriment of long-term economic health of the
industry.

Thus, a producer-oriented agency undertakes

policies which hurt the very businesses it attempts to regulate while harming the public it was created to defend. 36
To name only a few ICC operational restrictions, carriers cannot issue securities without the expressed consent
of the Commission which may dictate the terms and conditions
of the financial offering.

New carrier entry and expansion

of present service is impossible without application and
approval of a certificate of need and convenience as a
common carrier or a permit as a contract carrier.

Existing

carriers usually oppose applicant's proof of need and convenience.

These documents specify the territory, route,

commodity, and whether authority granted by the ICC may be
added (tacked) on to present authority so through service
may be provided.

Mergers are just as severely limited as

entry procedures; for, one carrier cannot purchase ten percent of another carrier's stock until ICC approval is gained

36 Mark J. Green, ed., The Monopoly Makers: Ralph Nader's
Study Group Report on Regulation and Competition (New York,
N.Y.: Grossman Publishers, 1973), p. 143.

20
through filed application.

Many mergers rubberstamped by

the ICC are subjected to lengthy and costly litigation all
the way to the Supreme Court as the Justice Department
voices its difference of opinion.

Some motor carrier mer-

gers may take as many as five years to consumate.

Addi-

tionally, surface carriers must insure the goods they transport for full actual value per ICC dictate; and, they are
held fully responsible unless damage is due to an act of
nature while air and water carriers have only limited liability at most.37

37williams, The Future of American Transportation:

4-5.
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THE DECLINE IN COMPETITION

Key question in any study of competition is whether
or not the economy operates very differently than it could
in a purely competitive nature.

The degree of monopoly

control is very important in determining the amount of
concentration.

Control would be absent under pure compe-

titian in all operations of a business.

Concentration of

control really focuses on various aspects of market control.
Pure competition has never existed in quantity in any economic
system, for very long.

To quote Edward Mason, "Markets in

which the demand for products of an individual firm is perfectly elastic have probably never existed outside of
agriculture and, at times, the organized produce and security
exchanges."

38

The theory of monopolistic competition states that
the degree of monopolistic control each business firm
possesses is determined by the degree of difference between
that firm and the competition.

Many markets with large

numbers of sellers that are relatively equal in size even
results in some degree of monopoly control due to product
differentiation.

What is considered detrimental to the

public is collusion among market firms that leads to

38Edward s. Mason, Economic Concentration and the
Monopoly Program (Forage Village, Mass.: Murray Printing
Co., 1857), pp. 46-47.
21

22
monopolistic rather than competitive practices in the
marketplace. 39
The traditional yardstick to measure market concentration and the subsequent decline in competition is Gardiner
Means' asset evaluation of 200 of the largest corporations in
1930 America.

He has found non-banking corporations accounted

for thirty-eight percent of the country's business wealth.
Means was not studying market control per se, but his figures
are frequently used to highlight concentration of control.
Mason indicates great care must be taken in any market concentration study due to an existing shortage of data.

He also

cautions that before certain data can be used to indicate
concentration of control accurately, both market relations
and the internal business organization must be researched.
Further, not only must the study analyze existing conditions
but it must review those aspects over time to allow a valid
conclusion on concentration of control.

Presently, no

statistical sources are available to indicate the market share
of various industries or to trace development of their relative markets except through such tangibles as physical output, sales, or total assets.

Hence, a study revealing the

statistics of output produced by independent companies cannot
solely result in conclusions concerning price and production
policies of those firms since many other factors need to be

39rbid.

23
.
40
taken into consi'd eration.

Markets dominated by several large firms frequently
illustrate concentration of control through price leadership.
The leading firm formulates its price and production schedules
while estimating probable effects on rival firms as well as
the entire market.

This practice indicates concentration of

control, but degree is dependent on the extent of market
leader actions taken to preserve its position by anticipating
rivals' actions.

At certain times market prices have been

set by particular industry leaders only to have followers
break away during periods of rapidly changing business conditions.

However, under monopolistic control, all firms

setting their prices with regard for effects on the competition's prices can totally eliminate price competition.

Fre-

quently, trade associations have used statistical and pricereporting services to prompt industry-wide actions on price
.
41
an d pro d uction.

Interestingly, prolonged price stability,

under rapidly changing market conditions in an industry which
usually has fluctuating prices, is a good indication of
monopoly power in action.

A purely competitive market by its

inherent nature could not remain stagnant when demand and
cost change. 42

40rbid., pp. 47-50.
4lrbid., p. 51.
42 Ibid., p. 52.

l
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According to Edward Mason, the real test of monopoly
power should be the restriction of competition.

Very little

attention has focused on the evidence pertinent to market
control until recently when courts began to accept the contract itself as evidence of economic restriction and an
overt attempt at monopoly structures. 43
Workable competition in any industry necessitates a
large number of sellers and buyers, no collusion between the
two groups, and easy market entry for infant firms.
qualities of this competition would be:

Desirable

pressure for product

or process improvement; downward adjustments in prices coincidental with cost; unit production of efficient size; efficient
output capacity adjustment; and avoidance of resource waste.
Applying Mason's concepts to the motor carrier industry,
certain conflicts between competitive standards and usual
business practices are apparent:
(1)

Difficulties arise in judging motor carrier economy

of scale concerning management complexity, multiplant (terminal)
property management, and size advantages in bargaining versus
the advantageous procurement of needed services.
(2)

The number of motor carriers may be too few to

pass the market structure test (no firm has monopoly control)
in workable competition.
(3)

Economic cycles may require that workable compe-

tition be modified in the motor carrier industry.

43 Ibid., p. 341.
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(4)

Workable competition requires the absence of

collusion among all motor carriers.
(5)

Workable competition produces improved products

and services from innovative ideas within the motor carrier
industry.
Significantly, antitrust actions may appear to be dictated by
corporate actions, but when viewed in the context of presence
or absence of market conditions, these same actions pass the
. .
45
war k a bl e competition test.

45rbid., pp. 355-357.
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V.

MOTOR CARRIER COMPETITION

The ICC View of Competition
In the area of competition, the Interstate Commerce
commission always maintains that completely adequate competition exists throughout the diffuse transportation modes;
and, in the ICC's view, excessive competition is totally
unacceptable because it tends to eliminate smaller carriers.
But when queried about industry competition among motor
carriers, the Commission equivocates by insisting that the
National Transportation Act of 1920 requires it to defend
the economic stability of all carriers it regulates; and,
the Commission further fears repetition of 1935 conditions
which originally brought the trucking industry under its
jurisdiction.

Officially, the ICC considers its ''regulated

competition"· a stimulant which demands carrier purchase of
new, larger capacity equipment; experimentation with new
pricing methods; and methods of more efficient service. 46
One of the ICC's major fears has always been that elimination
of motor carrier entry control would result in the same
chaotic situation of the 1930s which led Congress to enact
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 giving the ICC its initial
authority over truck transportation.

The Commission has

46 Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission:
26

32.

27
frequently argued that free entry into the motor carrier
industry would create a rash of financially irresponsible
firms and lead to additional carriers saturating the market
to the point that rate wars and cutthroat competition are
rampant.

In actuality, there is no basis to this claim. 47

Regardless. of the ICC's efforts, entry control has not
eliminated fly-by-night operations (its stated purpose), in
fact, they thrive.

ICC regulatory interpretation and

administration create artificially high rates which entice
unauthorized and irresponsible motor carriers to steal regulated carriers' traffic by offering cheaper freight rates.
Motor carrier deregulation would force lower rates as a
result of competition and eliminate entry of gypsy firms
which compete by lower rates alone.

The ICC expresses great

concern about the financial responsibility of fly-by-night
operations; however, its enforcement efforts in this area
have been weak at best.

Importantly, entry control elimina-

tion will require renewed enforcement in the areas of safety
and financial responsibility for freight insurance purposes.
In the ICC's view, these two areas are perhaps the greatest
threats to motor carrier deregulation and a new system of
free entry.

The ICC fears increased competition would result

in decreased safety from poorly maintained and operated
equipment, and the shipping consumer would be forced to absorb
great financial loss if carriers failed to carry any cargo

47 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
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ICC control of entry has successfully

liability insurance.

prevented rate war chaos and cutthroat competition.

In reality

though, the ICC has gone to the other extreme resulting in
price fixing, collusion, and imperfect monopolistic competition which favors only the largest carriers. 48
Other ICC devices limiting intermodal and intramodal
competition exist.

As previously noted, the ICC states,

"From the beginning of federal motor carrier regulation,
restrictions generally have been imposed to protect already
authorized carriers from unintended and unwarranted competitian

"

Competition is a disease to be avoided rather

than a beneficial policy to be promoted.

The Commission's

restrictions are specific and strict, and may dictate vehicle
type, trip origins, destinations (with route to be traveled),
service area, and specific commodity to be transported.

All

regulated carriers suffer under one or more of these symptoms,
and the most important restriction is operating limitations. 50
These restrictions create substantial efficiency losses since
carriers with limited authority or restricted routings cannot
backload their trucks.

The resultant empty backhauls repre-

sent a great amount of excess capacity in the industry.

ICC

restrictions on geographical routing prevents one carrier from
wresting traffic from a previously established carrier with
.
.
51
d irect
route aut h ority.

48Ibid.
50Green, The Monopoly Makers:
51Ibid., pp. 144-145.
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Purported benefits of ICC regulation are:
(1)

Common carrier service is increased even for those

shippers that unregulated carriers might find uneconomical to
serve.

(2)

Rate decreases may increase service competition.

However, Walter Miklius, economist, concludes that in the
highly competitive area of exempt agricultural commodities,
transportation service quality was far better than in the
regulated segment.

James Nelson states that there is little

basis to conclude that regulated carrier service justifies
higher rates.
( 3)

petition.

Regulation avoids the chaos of unrestrained comThe Miklius study concludes that the hypothesis

of excessive competition is unfounded.

R. N. Farmer surmises

that the exempt industry is stable from his study of unregulated agricultural carriers.

In 1972, the Council of Economic

Advisers determined little danger from deregulated competition
existed.5 2
A recent analysis of regulation and innovation in the
motor carrier industry finds the "ICC has done the poorest job
of all regulatory agencies" and that the obsession with preserving inherent advantages of each mode requires the cornmission to rule against any innovative changes.

In essence, the

present ICC perpetuated restrictions and procedures serve only
to protect inefficient carrier operations rather than allowing

52 I b'd
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p. 149.
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competition to allocate services and reduce prices. 53
The Deregulator's View
Evidence from transportation models suggests that
deregulation would create no rate wars nor any cutthroat
competition but rather increase industry stimulation and
carrier competitiveness resulting in better services for
the shipping public.

Competition created by free entry

would necessitate some duplication of investment for plant
(terminals) and equipment (trucks and trailers), but this
effect would be counterbalanced by the lower freight rates
resulting from competition.

Present ICC regulatory policies

create great amounts of excess capacity since the benefits
of competition cannot be realized.

Frequently, carriers

possessing limited commodity authority or routes of operation are not allowed to haul loads of authorized commodities.

These partially loaded trucks create the large amount

of capacity under~utilization plaguing the trucking industry
today.

Most carriers are only allowed to haul certain

commodities so they frequently end up carrying less than
full truck loads of just a few commodities.

These less than

truck load (LTL) shipments are inefficient and fuel wasting:
problems which extended commodity authority could solve by
allowing greater carrier opportunity to load equipment completely.

Empty backhauls are also evidence of excess capacity.

53 Ibid.
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Nothing results in more fuel waste or inefficiency than
.
k 54
operating
an empty true.

The ICC's Inventory of Motor

carriers concludes that substantial capacity under-utilization exists in the trucking industry since only nineteen
percent of all authority grants had backhaul provisions. 55
In another effort yielding similar results, the Nelson study
indicates that the greater the scope of carrier authority,
the greater is the likelihood of truck load backhauls.

Nelson

finds only 10.3 percent of the fifty largest common carriers
do not possess any backhaul authority.

Further, Nelson finds

of all regulated common carriers, less than 1.0 percent lack
backhaul authority.56
In a truly competitive transportation system, efficient
motor carriers should drive the inefficient firms out of
business with the results being innovation, lower rates and
better customer service.

Carriers failing to utilize plant

and equipment optimally and lower cost to meet competition will
be forced out of business.

Thus, the wide variations in

levels of efficiency that presently exist between competing
carriers will not endure.

Fellmeth has conducted variation

studies of all transportation modes to indicate actual levels
of competition.

High variation levels have suggested a lack

of competition and the protected operations of inefficient

54Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission:
55Ibid., p. 127.
56Ibid.

126-127.
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carriers while low levels of variation indicate a competitive
system or uniformly efficient levels of all participants.
Hence, coefficients of variation should be very low for the
competitive and, subsequently, more efficient operation. 57
Fellmeth elaborates:
Our separate examples gave us some interesting
comparisons. The degree of variation seems consistently related to the degree of regulatory limitations imposed by the ICC.
Just as concentration
seems to increase the coefficient of variation of
regulation does too. Thus, general freight irregular route carriers have the lowest variation in
revenue/GTM, followed by the regular route (more
restricted) general freight carriers, followed by
interline carriers (not only route specified runs,
but generally shorter as well), followed by contract
and finally by household movers.
The same holds true for the mean values, particularly the revenues/GTM (cost/GTM) figures.
The very lowest is the unregulated agricultural
sample, next is general freight irregular route,
then general freight regular route (route specified), and then high interline, contract, and
finally special and household carriers. Unit rates
and unit costs increase with the degree of regulation.SB
Thus, with deregulation unit rates and unit costs will decrease substantially.59
ICC protection and carrier collusive actions sustain
rates at artificially high levels since no significant
degree of rate competition exists in the trucking industry.
The Continuing Traffic Study (CTS) indicates there is no real
price competition in general freight shipments since such a

S 7 Ibid., p. 70.
58 Ibid., p. 71.
59Ibid.

33

small percentage is affected by independently filed rates.

60

Illogically, industry spokesmen still contend that price
competition exists due to independent actions filed by carriers despite widespread price fixing.61

CTS data reveals

that independently filed rates account for less than three
percent of all general freight shipments and less than two
percent of LTL shipments. 62

The only competition that does

exist is based on the quality and level of customer service,
a nebulous and vague area for evaluation.

If industry adop-

tion of cost-saving innovations is considered any indication
of service competition, then very little exists in the industry.

Debate rages as to whether regulated carriers provide

greater customer service than exempt carriers.

However many

shippers do not feel regulated service justifies its high
costs:

shippers do not require greater service at the rates

carriers charge.

Evidence of this fact lies in increased

redirection of regulated freight to private carriers and
gypsy, for-hire operations.

Shippers sacrifice greater ser-

vice for more reasonable rates.

Service competition usually

consists of more trucks hauling less than capacity loads.
This situation gives quicker, more expensive service for the

60u.s., Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry, Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation on S. 1400.
96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979,
Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979),
p. 380.
6lrbid., p. 361.
62Ibid., p. 383.
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shipper but remains only one of many inefficient practices
indicative of the ineffective competition plaguing the
trucking industry.

Other marks of an inefficient transporta-

tion system are practices such as unnecessary highway mileage
due to routing or gateway restraints, high costs caused by
carrier collusion, empty mileage due to commodity restrictions, and partial loads caused by excess capacity.

Various

authorities have estimated excess capacity of fifty percent
exists in the regulated trucking industry from unnecessary
empty and partially full hauls; hence, the chronic capacity
under-utilization problem for the industry. 63
Gateway restrictions, Interstate Highway use restrictions and circuitous regular routes significantly extend
mileage without rational economic cause.

As an example, a

motor carrier providing transportation between eastern
Pennsylvania and eastern Virginia travel additional miles
through western Virginia in compliance with an ICC gateway
restriction while a direct route down the Atlantic coast would
save sixty percent mileage and time.

This inefficiency in-

herent within the ICC system of regulation is by no mere
chance:

the practice prevents a carrier from winning

customers from carriers with direct route authority. 64

Though

actual profits may not be exorbitant, the high rates created
by the high costs of inefficiency are unacceptable when a

63rbid., pp. 129-130.
64Ibid., p. 130.
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better means exists through increased competition.
ance with regulatory restrictions such as:

Compli-

rate bureau

membership, authority applications, grants and expansions,
and expensive filing fees, attorneys, and hearings add
unduly to ordinary costs of transportation which must be
65
reflected in higher freight rates.
The rate structure of regulated motor carriers are
economically unsound since the principle of value of service
pricing insures rates do not reflect the true cost of transportation.

A practice only perpetuated by rate fixing

through the concerted efforts of carriers under condescending
ICC gaze.

Very high rates on some commodities subsidize the

transportation of other lower paying commodities which might
not move otherwise; however, this practice violates the law
of supply and demand in transportation service.

These

practices distort the transportation system to the point
that very low subsidized rates divert freight traffic from
carriers actually capable of lower cost movement of the
commodities.
In 1966, economist Walter Miklius instituted a comprehensive study of exempt agricultural carriers.

He concludes

that:
In the competitive (exempt from regulation)
sector the quality of service was superior to that
in the regulated sector. Specifically, there was

1.

65Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 131.
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no need to interline, and therefore no delay or
damage.
Equipment was available to meet peak
periods.
Exempt carriers had better time schedules.
Shippers said that, in general, they got better
more personalized service.
Exempt truckers exercised more care in handling cargo and in checking
temperature and humidity than their regular counterparts.
Finally, exempt carriers were willing to
load and unload at multiple points; 2.
Competitive
rates were generally lower than regulated rates;
3.
Perhaps most important, the competitive rate
structure seemed to be patterned closely on the
costs of providing service; and 4.
"The available
evidence from the competitive section (that he
compiled), conclusions of studies, foreign evidence
with non-regulated trucking are all inconsistent
with the hypothesis of 'excessive competition. ,,,67
Further, R. N. Farmer finds that the agriculturally exempt
trucking industry tends to be quite stable in his study of
carriers in a tri-state area around Washington, D.c.68

In

the unregulated market segment, evidence shows adequate
carrier investment does exist to replace worn and inefficient
equipment.

Walter Miklius concludes there is no difference

in the age of regulated carrier equipment versus an exempt
carrier's equipment. 69

Thus, unregulated carriers can main-

tain the present equipment and purchase replacement equipment
even under competitive rather than protective rate policies.
Carriers entice shippers with low rates or improved services
which are created by innovation and desire to improve. 70
Though covering limited commodities and a relatively short

67rbid., p. 132.
68rbid., p. 133.
69rbid.
70rbid.
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time span, Nelson concludes, after reviewing USDA studies,
that restrictive entry control, minimum pricing, absence
of economies of scale, and diversion of traffic from regulated
carriers to unregulated truckers supports the contention that
widespread deregulation would result in renewed competition
and service innovation for the industry. 71
According to Senator Edward Kennedy, three important
policy questions arise involving truck deregulation and
public wellbeing:
1.

Deregulation would help cut inflation.

Barry

Bosworth, Senate Judiciary Committee witness, estimates
savings of five billion dollars to American consumers.
2.

Deregulation would help conserve energy.

Approxi-

mately twenty percent of the total truck mileage covered
annually is empty due to government regulations.

Fuel

savings could be substantial.
3.

Deregulation would eliminate needless government

interference in business by:
(al Outlawing private price fixing.
(b) Eliminating commodity restrictions.
(cl Allowing freer entry into the industry.
(d) Allowing rates to fluctuate under market conditions within a zone of reasonableness.
4.

Deregulation could establish more stringent safety

71 Ibid., p. 134.
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criteria for the motor carrier industry.

72

According to Dr. Ann Freilaender, competition could
be increased within the motor carrier industry with no harmful economic effects.

She finds motor carrier concentration

exceedingly high and that nearly all trucking service markets
could efficiently support several times the number of firms
73
presently serving them.

72u.s., Senate, Economic Regulation of the Trucking
Industry: pp. 359-360.
73rbid., p. 380.
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VI.

MOTOR CARRIER CONCENTRATION

Evidence of Overconcentration
According to Senator Edward Kennedy's information, the
motor carrier industry consists of 16,000 regulated carriers.
Some 12,000 gross as little as 500,000 dollars or less
annually.

Industry spokesmen contend deregulation would pro-

mote mass concentration of smaller carriers under the organizational structure of larger firms resulting in the very
antithesis of competition.

But in defense of its own

concentration levels, the trucking industry repeatedly points
to the four largest steel makers which account for fortyseven percent of the market (the eight largest maintain fiftysix percent of the business), and the cigarette industry where
the four largest manufacturers possess eighty-four percent of
market sales. 74
For years no reliable statistics were available to
describe the concentration or competitiveness of the motor
carrier industry until the Continuing Traffic Study (CTS)
was completed in 1966.

The Senate Judiciary Committee has

consolidated CTS data; and, concentration studies based on
traffic origins and destinations of 30,000 freight bills
indicate an uncompetitive, highly concentrated industry

74 Ibid., p. 361.
39

40

between certain city pairs (Los Angeles to New York, for
example) .

The computer generated CTS is also used as basis

.
.
for carrier
rate increases
by the ICC. 75

Trend so f mergers

and large carrier acquisitions over the last two decades
have severely limited competition while increasing market
concentrations of other firms.

Fewer firms are involved

in trucking, average company size is increasing, and the
larger corporations are capturing even greater proportions
of the nation's total freight volume.

With prevalent entry

barriers and tight operational restrictions, many carriers
enjoy great monopoly power.

The ICC policy toward carrier

concentration ranges from permissiveness to actual promotion
of the necessary large carrier mergers with small carriers.
Perhaps the Commission, as overworked as it considers itself,
thinks fewer carriers would mean less adjudication.

Coin-

ciding with this philosophy is the ICC's "failing carrier"
doctrine in which the public interest is best served when a
failing carrier is taken over by a large, successful carrier
that provides better shipper service.76
Factually, there is no evidence to suggest greater size
translates into increased motor carrier economy; for, all
previous studies indicate there is no inherent advantage in
larger size.

Most carriers merge to eliminate interhcange

75 Ibid.
76 Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission:
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charges and to gain access to new territory.

Since the ICC

grants such restrictive operating rights, successful carriers who desire to expand their geographical service area
must go through long and costly application procedures to extend their certificates.

Consequently, motor carriers find

it much more advantageous to merge with a small or failing
firm already possessing certificate authority over the
desired route.

As an example, seven large trucking companies

merged to create Associated Transport: a single firm designed
to provide a needed single-line service, in the carrier's
view, from Florida to the Northeast.

Although the ICC ap-

proved this action, the Commission failed to realize that the
economic disadvantages of interlining were the direct results
of its own territorial restrictions; thus, the rteed for East
Coast through-service could have been remedied without
further concentration by removing carrier geographic restric.
77
tions.
Freedom to conduct business in a specific geographical
area has developed into saleable "merchandise" due to ICC
actions.

Rather than conduct trucking operations themselves,

many firms, after receiving operating authority on particular
routes, quickly sell these ICC-bestowed certificates to
expanding carriers at a profit.

In essence, the consumer

foots the bill; for, truckers must consider the costs of their
certificates, however obtained (whether purchase, merger, or

77 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
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ICC hearings) as a business expense to be covered within
the service rates charged.

These higher rates are far

easier to obtain since the carrier has virtually complete
monopoly power as granted through ICC competition protection.
Subsequent to sales or merger of carrier authority, consumers
often lose the advantages of competition, and they often
complain that the larger truckline is more difficult to
communicate with, less responsive to small volume shippers,
and less eager to haul less than truck load (LTL) freight.
Consumers in small towns have found extensive service
deterioration. 7 8

As an example, firm A carries freight

from Elgin, Illinois to Chicago while firm B transports
commodities of the same type from Rockford, Illinois to
Elgin.

If the LCC allows the merger of firm A and B, the

resultant carrier can delivery along the entire Rockford to
Chicago route.

The enlarged common carrier is required under

provision of the Interstate Commerce Act to transport any
freight he possesses authority and has capacity to haul ...
without any shipper discrimination.

In practice, however, the

new carrier attracts so much Rockford to Chicago traffic that
Elgin freight loses importance; thus, lacking the inducement
of competition, the carrier cuts special services and number
of runs on unprofitable routes, and provides poorer, more
expensive service to the shipping public in the Elgin area. 79

78Ibid.
79Ibid., pp. 108-109.
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Among experts, substantial agreement asserts that no
significant degree of scale economy exis.ts in motor carrier
operations; thus, a firm's size does not guarantee a patent
advantage by itself.

Actually, average haul length determines

a firm's unit costs according to Professors Meyer, Peck,
Stenason, and Zwick.

This conclusion is based on the premise

that haul size will vary little among firms; therefore, the
only other variable element that could possibly affect unit
cost is length of haul.

The studies of Robert Nelson and

Merill Roberts support this conclusion.

The Nelson study

of 102 New England carriers attains a very high of variation (+0.82) between haul length and ton-mile cost.

High

traffic density over authorized routes allow certain carriers
definite cost advantages according to other experts.

80

Cost characteristics such as fixed cost, excess
capacity, variable cost, etc., vary greatly within the motor
carrier mode due to types of commodities transported and
firm classification.

Firms may be categorized as common

carriers, contract carriers, or private carriers.

Common

carriers are authorized to serve the general public, contract
carriers provide regular service to particular shippers, and
private carriers are shippers who transport their own goods.
A primary cost difference among carriers is the higher terminal
facilities.

However, some experts have calculated that pri-

vate and contract carriers incur eleven percent higher

so Ib1·d ., pp. 58- 59 .

------

44
ton-mile costs on line-haul operations than common carriers.

Lower average number of loads for private and con-

tract carriers is the reason for this since they cannot
lawfully haul freight on return trips.

The lower terminal

maintenance costs of private and contract carriers counterbalance higher line-haul costs up to 300 miles distance
according to most experts.

Private and contract carriers

operate with lower unit costs than common carriers can sustain below this point.

A large amount of private and con-

tract carriage is over 300 miles.

One estimate indicates

over fifty percent of all ton-miles hauled 200 miles or more
are moved by either private or contract carriers.

In a

competitive system, private and contract carriers would not
exist if they were indeed less efficient and more expensive
than common carriers. 81

Professor Meyer states that private

and contract carriers move over fifty percent of freight
over 300 miles because of the combined effects of regulatory
and managerial policies imposed by the ICC.

The economic

reality is that while common carriers should be more efficient
at these distances, ICC restrictions on freight rates fail
to reflect their advantage.

ICC regulatory policy demands

equal treatment of all shippers regardless of actual lowcost, large-volume, long-distance traffic which would mean
lower shipping costs if the forces of competition were
allowed to operate.

"Value-of-service" rate-·making creates

high-rates on high-value freight regardless of the actual

81Ibid., p. 59.
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cost of transportation.

Rather than subscribe to these rates

many shippers employ contract or private carriage. 82

Empha-

sizing this point, Fellmeth has conducted a large scale regression analysis of motor carriers' most advantageous
features.

The study provides a breakdown of cost components

among the different types of carriers and examines deregulation
effects on the trucking industry.

Fellmeth's study finds

that gross ton-miles operated, operating revenues, and
financial asset measures concerning carrier size have no
direct or consistent correlation with the carrier's actual
operational efficiency.

The only carriers with any appearance

6f economy of scale are household movers.

With regard to

route mileage, carrier size does correlate to some degree
with increases in efficiency thus indicating the direct cost
of ICC route restrictions, and the financial value of route
extension authority granted by the rcc. 83

The Fellmeth study

analyzes operational features such as traffic density along
carrier routes, average haul length multiplied by average
load size, and owned (as opposed to leased) equipment use.
Average haul length multiplied by average load size would
represent an increase in carrier efficiency while an increase
in traffic density (more partially loaded trucks on the same
route) does not.

Although unit cost and efficiency benefits

exist in high-load, long-di.stance hauls, carriers can adjust
operational equipment uni ts to meet total fre·ight volume

82rbid., p. 59.
83rbid.
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regardless of density.

As Fellmeth states:

This, plus the lack of economy of scale evidence,
precludes any rational basis for increasing carrier
size because of improved efficiency per se. Thus,
the motor carrier merger movement is motivated
either by a desire to expand simply for the sake of
increased size, or for increased assets, or because
merger allows the amalgamation of operating authority
grants for more monopoly power which would be reflected in the rate structure.84
Since there is no optimum economic size, the ICC entry barrier
and merger policy serve to hinder the development of efficient motor transportation.85

Ann Friedlaender and

Richard Spady, foremost trucking industry experts from M.I.T.,
conclude that no economies of scale exist in the industry,
and average carrier costs actually increase beyond certain
levels of output. 86

Utilization of leased vehicles and

drivers (owner operators) increase the operational efficiency
of a carrier as its percentage of owned vehicles declines.
This supports various experts in their conclusion that low
initial entry barriers exist in the trucking industry itself
while the ICC's authority grants are the principal entry
restraints.

Possession of ICC authority is the only require-

ment to establish lease-haul arrangements with owner-operators
and can attain great value where ICC protection from competition allows monopoly profits. 87

84Ibid., p. 60.
85Ibid., p. 58.
86u.s., Senate, Economic Regulation of the Trucking
Industry:
380.
87Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission:
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Index of Concentration
The standard index of concentration is a ratio which
defines the market share a motor carrier has captured.

Tra-

ditionally, if one firm captures fifty percent or more of a
market's business activity then cause exists for an antitrust investigation into potential monopolistic abuses.

It

is possible for a shared monopoly or oligopoly to exist with
significant business domination by ten or more firms.

These

ratios of concentration can indicate high concentration
levels and possible monopoly power, but large numbers of
£irms and low concentration ratios do not have to indicate a
lack of monopoly power in a particular region.

Unless car-

riers are transporting the same commodities over the same
routes while serving the same regions, concentration ratios
alone will fail to provide much useful information.

A motor

carrier's relevant market concentration is closely governed
by the ICC authority conferred since it defines the carrier's
competitive opportunity through highly detailed and complex
restrictions.

A carrier can exercise monopoly power over a

single commodity over a certain route:

it would be possible

to develop an unlimited number of them.

In this regard, no

data at present suggests a definite number of relevant markets although millions potentially exist.BB
Since the birth of the industry, there have always
been many small companies engaged in motor transportation due

BBibid., pp. 62-63.
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to a lack of economies of scale and the small initial capital
investment required to start service. 89

But the trucking

industry is no longer an infant since all facets represent
a 108 billion dollar annual business.

Motor carriers account

for more than seventy-five percent of the total revenues that
Under

the entire transportation sector of the economy earns.

regulation, small trucking firms suffer because they cannot
expand without expensive and time consuming ICC proceedings.
Individuals lacking "grandfathering" clauses dating to 1935
are effectively locked out of the regulated motor carrier
industries.

As Senator Edward Kennedy says, "The best proof

that truck deregulation works is the fact that more than
half of the trucking industry has never been regulated." 90

'
Over the past several decades, however, Lorenz Curne has
concluded that there has been a steady trend toward increasing industry concentration.91

Illustrative of Curne's find-

ings is the declining number of carriers, even though motor
carrier traffic and revenue volumes have grown exponentially
since comprehensive regulation was instituted by the ICC.
Meanwhile, the number of regulated carriers was wained from
approximately 26,167 in 1939 to about 15,125 in 1968. 92
Statistics show that while general commodity carriers

89 I b'd
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90 u.s., Senate, Economic Regulation of the Trucking
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declined in quantity, the size of the surviving carriers
generally increased.

In fact, the number of general commodity

carriers possessing assets in excess of ten million dollars
increased from 64 to 137 between the years of 1957 and
1965. 93

The motor carrier trend toward concentration and

increased operational size is not the response to healthy
competitive growth.

Industry entry is made practically

impossible by ICC authority requirements and specific operational restrictions.

Consequently, by refusing to allow new

authority grants compatible with transportation growth and
volume needs, the ICC increases motor carrier size.
Neither the ICC nor any other agency has undertaken
comprehensive studies on point to point competition throughout the motor carrier industry.

Further, even if the ICC

based carrier concentration on captured market share in a
particular area, the figures would be meaningless since
classification into ICC regional groupings is based on the
location of the carrier's main offices, not on the carrier
groupings as they actually compete.

TRINC, a division of

Dun and Bradstreet, has produced twenty carrier groupings
which actually reflect operations according to motor carrier
region.

TRINC analysis of 1968 data shows that in half of

the regions studied market shares are dominated by from
three to six motor carriers.

Substantial concentration

exists in the trucking industry due to the fact, as Robert

93 Ibid., p. 66.

50

Fellmeth states, "that actual markets are divided within
TRINC's regions according to specific route restrictions
and by infinite commodity limitations." 94

Motor carrier

concentration trends toward a formerly oligopolistic and
now monopolistic structure does not lower rates previously
established through regional rate bureau collusion; but, it
does make rate collusion machinery more effective.

The

end result is a decline in shipper service competition with
carrier inclination toward additional collusive action. 95
As James Nelson states:
A considerable number of regulated truckers still
operate on dense traffic routes between large,
relatively close population centers ... , even on
many routes, generating fairly dense traffic flows,
the number of general commodity motor carriers
authorized to give single-line service varies from
two or three up to six or ten common carriers.96
The first danger to the national transportation market is
that market concentration exerted by large firms will easily
develop into oligopoly or monopoly.

The second danger,

according to Robert Fellmeth, is price fixing:

11

The

dominance of very large firms obviously has facilitated concerted action rates." 97

A few large firms can more easily

agree on rate increases than a larger number of small ones.

94rbid.
95rbid., pp. 66-67.
96rbid., p. 12s.
97

rbid.
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Fellmeth further emphasizes, "With fewer and larger firms,
the rate suspension and minimum rate procedures can be
utilized more effectively to thwart independent action." 98
In one of the original trucking industry studies, Trucking
Mergers and Concentration, conducted for the Senate Small
Business Committee in 1956, Professors Walter Adams and
James Hendry found "disturbing" concentration levels.

Con-

centration has steadily increased in the industry since
99
·
tha t stu d y • s comp1 etion.

.
.
In a 1 ater s t u d y, t h e Continuing

Traffic Study (CTS), referred to by Senator Edward Kennedy,
long-haul markets in excess of 750 miles contained four
large competitors with a sixty-two percent share of the
total market.

The four largest medium-haul carriers, from

300 to 750 miles, serve sixty-four percent of the market.
Four of the largest short-haul carriers have captured sixty.
.
100
.
four percent of their respective market.
A third danger
of market concentration exists since only large firms are
capable of abusing value-of-service pricing to their own
advantage in distorting the rate structure.

Small firms

can only maximize income from value-of-service rates.

As

Fellmeth points out, "However, the breadth of authority held
by large firms allows high revenues from value of service
carriage to subsidize low revenues from rates adjusted

98 Ibid.
99Ibid.
lOOu.s., Senate, Economic Regulation of the Trucking
Industry:
381-382.
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downward to meet competition.

Therefore, uncompetitive

shipments subsidize competitive shipments distorting whatever
·
· h
"inherent a d vantage n a competitor
mig
t have." 101

pricing has two effects:

Such

(1) Lower rates offered by large

carriers easily bankrupt more efficient small carriers because the larger carrier's subsidized rates need not reflect
actual transportation costs or revenues to the same extent
that small carriers require on the same freight.

(2) Low

subsidized rates tend to distort cost economies to the
point that other more efficient transportation modes lose
certain freight traffic to motor carriers.

This unrealistic

traffic diversion to truck transportation contributes
immensely to the decline of other carrier modes such as
rail or water. 102
Due to ICC regulation, lower concentration levels exist
in the East and Midwest which contain firms that received
their operating authority under the ICC grandfather clause
of 1935.

In the West and Southwest where the ICC has severely

limited new firm entry since 1935 average concentration levels
. h . 103
are h ig

The only factor that accounts for little varia-

tion in regional trucking costs and operations is ICC regulation, and, as a result, unusually high market share concentrations exist for the largest carriers.

Market concentration

101Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission: 127-129.
102Ibid.
103u.s., Senate, Economic Regulation of the Trucking
Industry: 383.
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is much higher than it would be if market forces were allowed
to freely operate as they should.

ICC entry regulations

determine the level of market concentration.

High concentra-

tion does not guarantee profitability and efficiency; though
a firm may operate in an unconcentrated market, it may still
operate at a profit.

M.I.T. studies have shown trucking

industry concentration is far too high and really exceeds
levels of concentration in other heavily concentrated
.
104
b usinesses.

104rbid.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Several major points have been established:
(1)

The Interstate Commerce Commission was created

to eliminate shipper discrimination.
(2)

The ICC was organized in commission form to

dispell fears of government invading private business and
to limit powers of the executive branch of government.
(3)

The ICC used lengthy adjudication to gain the

respect of the judicial system for its rulings.
(4)

The ICC vigorously pursued its perceived purpose

of providing stable conditions for industry growth, i.e.,
limiting competition.
(5)

The ICC completely failed in its mandate as a

natio.nal planning agency for the entire transportation
industry.
(6)

The Commission unduly restrained competition

though the country required additional industry capacity to
meet expanded growth.
(7)

The Commission allowed excessive concentration in

certain market areas by controlling entry, routing restrictions, commodity specifications, equipment requirements, and
even by control of corporate mergers.
The ICC has failed miserably to meet the transportation needs
of the nation with the most service for the least cost.
54

If

55

anything, the ICC has allowed and encouraged regulated common
carriers to provide mediocre customer service at cost plus a
premium,rather than a normal profit margin like the unregulated segment of the trucking industry.

Deregulation of the

regular common carrier segment is definitely warranted.
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